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Abstract:  A reader of jurisprudence might conclude that only philosophers raise the question whether 
international law may be said to exist or is really law. But in terms of frequency, the question is probably raised 
more often by governments and states that are not trying to be philosophical. The increasing attention being paid to 
the need for, and the procedures for, objective validation of rules of international law in a burgeoning literature of 
international law evidences the seriousness of the problem, the responsibility of scholars for careful scholarship in 
this area of legal theory, and ultimately the good possibility of generally accepted standards for that kind of 
objective validation. 
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BASIC PREMISES AND BUILDING BLOCKS 
 
The Term Law in the International Arena 
 
 [pg83]* A reader of jurisprudence might conclude that only philosophers raise the 
question whether international law may be said to exist or is really law. But in terms of 
frequency, the question is probably raised more often by governments and states that are not 
trying to be philosophical. Hitler might have had genuine doubts whether his plans for 
aggression and territorial aggrandizement were contrary to law, and if told they were contrary to 
international law he would have felt the same urge to deny the meaning of the term "international 
law" that other heads of state have felt when purported legal rules stood in the way of their 
policies. Since Hitler died before the international legal prohibitions against unjustified 
aggression were actually enforced against individuals at Nuremberg, he may have gone to his 
death thinking that he had done nothing illegal. But did those legal rules depend upon subsequent 
"enforcement" before they could claim'" the title law?FN1 In what sense can we divorce law 
from its subsequent enforcement? 
 
 To begin at the most basic level possible, let us consider the categories of possible words 
that can be used to change or modify human behavior. We start with any person who has a 
choice, who can pick one of two courses of action or who can decide whether to go ahead or not 
to go ahead with one potential course of action.FN2 Certain kinds of words or messages can be 
communicated to him that might influence his choice. Someone might say, for example, "Plan A 
would be right but plan B would be immoral." That assertion might be backed up with arguments 
appealing to all kinds of sources, particularly the would-be actor's, that might give content to the 
meaning of morality. A second kind of message might be, "If you do A, my friends and I will 
help you; but if you do B, my friends and I will punish you." This threat of sanction, 
which may have no moral content, can effectively influence the actor providing that he is 
persuaded of the likelihood, credibility, and severity of the threat. A third type of message, at 
first glance quite different from those involving morality or physical sanction, is "If you do A 
you will be acting legally, but if you do B you will violate the law." Accompanying this [pg84]  
message will be arguments showing that A is indeed legal under the rules of law acknowledged 




 Is the legal message different in kind from the moral message or the sanctions message? 
Certainly we might postulate a purely imaginary society where the mere invocation of the term 
law is enough to channel all behavior in legal directions. In such a society no one has any 
intention of violating the law provided information is given as to what courses of action are 
illegal, and hence there are no violations of law and no enforcement machinery (police, prisons, 
etc.)  Human society probably will never reach such a system, but surely we cannot deny the title 
"law" to the rules of that system simply because there is no need for enforcement. Nor can we 
insist that the rules are necessarily rules of morality as we understand the latter term, because my 
brief  description of the imaginary system is complete without reference to the content of their 
rules. But now, descending to earth and taking human nature as it is, must the legal message have 
components that are also moral and physically enforceable? Natural-law theorists insist law is 
close to morality while positivists insist that it is close to "that which is enforced."FN4 How 
close? How necessarily close? These are questions which would take more space to deal with 
than is available here. We do not have to ask these particular questions to work out an 
understanding of the term international law for the purposes of this volume. Yet we have some 
guidelines, at least psychologically if not philosophically, for the interpretation of the legal 
message in terms of either the moral message or the sanctions message. 
  
 If rules of law were consistently at odds with generally understood rules of morality or 
justice, soon "cognitive dissonance"FN5 would intrude to vitiate the influence that the legal 
message would have upon our conduct. If we live in a system of immoral laws, we will spend 
our time thinking of ways to act illegally and subvert the system so as to establish a new system 
where the new laws will be entitled to respect. Surely a system of immoral laws will not last long 
if there is a psychological dissonance between its rules and those of morality. But now one can 
argue: what if the immoral laws are strictly and brutally enforced? This brings us to the positivist 
assertion of the interdependence between law and sanctions. But let us hold for a moment the 
case of enforcement of immoral laws, and consider first the relation between law and sanctions 
where we do not add the complexity of whether the rules are moral or immoral. 
  
 Let us now imagine another strange and purely imaginary society: a dictator has recently 
taken complete control over the military and police, and he announces that he [pg85] will enforce 
his own wishes whatever they will be and whether or not they are legal. He cares nothing for the 
legal system as it exists in the country prior to his take-over, and he will neither attempt to 
change nor enforce it. He then engages in a series of actions, some of which he openly admits are 
illegal, such as condemning for his own use without paying for it a large house owned by a 
private citizen and a swimming pool owned by a private corporation. Since he controls the police 
and the army, private resistance is futile. Perhaps he even enjoys admitting that his actions are 
illegal, since that gives him a greater sense of power. Now, could we argue that his actions are 
not illegal because he controls the physical power of the state? If so argued, we would be 
contradicting the express conclusion of both the dictator and all his subjects. We would find 
ourselves, on the outside of that society, adhering to a definition of legality that is at variance 
with that of everyone in the society. Quite the contrary, it makes perfect sense to claim that, 
although the dictator can get away with it because he controls the state's enforcement machinery, 
his illegal actions are not suddenly made legal because of that control any more than a criminal's 
theft is made legal because he got away with it. Yet, having said this much, we must also predict 
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that in a short period of time that society will experience a cognitive dissonance between rules of 
law and morality. Every parent knows that in teaching certain rules to children (such as the rule 
"Don't play in the street") the rule occasionally must be enforced, so as to make it stick. 
Otherwise the child will begin to disregard those rules that the parent sees the child violating but 
does nothing about. Yet it is not necessary that the parents enforce every rule, so long as the rules 
are clear, obeyable, and subject to enforcement. The authority of the rules will erode if they are 
not enforced more or less consistently. When the opposite of certain rules are enforced, at first 
one might conclude that the enforcement is illegal but later one might conclude that it is the 
opposite of the rules that truly constitute the law. Thus, the dictator's actions at first will be 
perceived to be illegal; after a period of time people will begin to wonder if they will not be 
better off it they recognize that the rules that the dictator enforces are those that are truly rules of 
law and the rules he is apparently violating are only the old rules of the pre-dictator regime. 
 
 Applying the preceding example to the case of enforcement of immoral laws, we can now 
see that if a system of immoral laws is systematically enforced, the people will be caught 
between two conceptions of law. On the one hand they will be reluctant to recognize the claim 
that they ought to obey the law in a moral sense, but on the other hand they will have to concede 
that there is no conflict between the asserted rules of law and the enforced rules. Surely this 
system will persist somewhat longer than one where the laws are simply immoral but there are 
no sanctions for disobeying them. Yet. the seeds of revolution must exist in the system, for the 
people will resent the enforcement of immoral laws even more than they would resent immoral 
laws that are not enforced. (Of course, the opposite is possible: the people may begin to learn a 
new standard of morality by virtue of repeated applications of legal rules that are enforced, but 
we are here dealing only with the assumption that in a given system laws are perceived as 
immoral and continue to be so perceived.) 
 
 Thus, we have some conclusions to draw from the above examples which are not 
necessarily rigid as a matter of philosophy but rather seem to be dictated by basic psychological 
observation. A legal system might exist at any moment in time that is totally divorced from 
moral standards, but it will probably not last long; similarly, it is hard to imagine how it came to 
exist in the first place since rules of law tend to evolve from moral considerations.FN6 Similarly, 
a legal system might exist at any moment in time [pg86] that is totally divorced from what the 
state will enforce, but over the longer run an accommodation will set in between what is legal 
and what is enforced. Yet it is no test of any individual law that it must be enforced to be a law. 
The international law against unjustified aggression existed in 1939 even though it wasn't going 
to be enforced until 1946 and even if it hadn't been enforced in 1946. It existed by virtue of the 
fact that it was contained in the. messages Hitler could have received from other subjects of 
international law at that time. The legal arguments justifying the particular law against 
international unjustified aggression of course had to be made, and made persuasively, but for 
present purposes we are assuming that those arguments could have been made. Our preliminary 
conclusion here is only that if those arguments could have been made, then there was an 
international legal rule against unjustified aggression in 1939. That rule was not dependent upon 
its later enforceability. Its status as law was dependent solely upon the assertion and belief by 
other actors that the rule was in fact a rule of law that was binding upon Hitler and capable of 




International Law in the Present World Community  
 
 The preceding arguments at best have shown only that a communication that a given rule 
is a rule of international law is prima facie as viable a claim as any other claim that a given rule 
is a rule of a particular legal system; what remains is the authentication of the given rule and not 
a dismissal that the claim is erroneous because of considerations having to do with the morality 
or enforceability of the rule. But even this much may be an important building block toward the 
construction of international law, since it avoids metaphysical inquiries into the nature of 
international law or the positivist claims that the content of law depends necessarily upon that 
which is enforced.  
 
 Yet authentication of an alleged rule does depend to some extent upon its congruence 
with the other two types of messages, those of morality and sanctions, for the simple reason that 
international law has persisted in roughly its present form through several centuries and hence 
we are not taking a time-slice of that law at an unrepresentative moment in its history the way 
we're doing with respect to the imaginary systems considered above. But even with this 
concession, international law today is undergoing some fundamental changes. Its relation to the 
normative (moral, natural law) realm as well as its relation to the enforcement (sanctions, 
positivist) dimension helps determine its actual content. This is not to say that a morally desirable 
rule is hence a rule of international law, nor to say that what the major powers might enforce 
(e.g., that only they are entitled to have nuclear weapons) is for that reason a rule of international 
law; such simple correspondences between the desired and the actual are quite alien to my 
contentions here. Not only are the relationships far more complex, but most importantly we are 
dealing with an objective realm of law and not with the law as we would like it to be. Any writer 
of course is tempted to write in his pet contentions to· the substance of international law that he 
purports objectively to describe, and as I have noted elsewhere, the force of one's own contention 
for what the law ought to be is helped by claiming that such rules of law are objective truths and 
not mere desiderata.FN8 We must try to overcome the temptation to write in our own 
preferences if we are purporting to describe an [pg87] objective reality. But nevertheless the 
previously mentioned relationships of law to the normative and enforcement realms remain and 
we have to deal with them objectively. 
  
 An important beginning has been made in the preceding chapter by Nicholas Onuf. 
Professor Onuf has set out the basic relationship between international law and the assumed 
objectivity of the positivist model as appropriately modified by H.L.A. Hart and Gidon Gottlieb. 
Additionally, he has demonstrated the basic tension in present international law between states as 
traditional subjects of that law and the rising claims of individuals against foreign states or even 
their own states. Unquestionably international law is being subjected to a kind of strain that is 
unprecedented in its history, yet the prognosis is not at all a pessimistic one. 
  
 The basic reason for guarded optimism is that respect for international law seems to be 
going up in a world where the use of military force among states seems to be going down. This 
simple observation constitutes a deep paradox for positivists, which as we shall see may be a 
good reason why positivistic theory is quite inadequate in its explanatory power. For if 
positivism views as necessary a correlation between the efficacy of law and its enforcement, then 
an increasing diminution in enforcement measures might seem to call for a degradation of the 
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power of law itself. Yet in the nuclear age international law seems to elicit increasing respect. 
Several explanations are possible. First, the existence of weapons of mass annihilation may have 
concomitantly reduced the number of wars but increased the stakes if any war were to break out; 
thus positivists might claim that international law is more enforceable than ever even if it is less 
enforced. But this claim would seem to be met by the argument that major powers would hardly 
resort to the use of nuclear warfare to ensure observance of international law, and hence for this 
particular purpose ICBM stockpiles are paper tigers. Second, perhaps respect for international 
law is more importantly connected with the internal stability of most national regimes coupled 
with increasing literacy on the part of the world population. These factors ensure that people are 
most sensitive to law in general, and hence their receptivity to international law in particular 
might be increasing. One might respond, however, to this argument by noting that the factors 
mentioned here have been around a long time, and thus do not seem to constitute a full 
explanation for the post-World War II situation. Third, one might contend more frontally that 
international law in fact is not on the ascendant since the International Court of Justice hardly has 
any cases they days compared to its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
But this observation would apparently equate the number of international disputes (and hence 
cases) with the existence of law; surely the fewer the disputes the more we can say that a legal 
system is truly efficacious. Moreover, the many disputes that exist today are not being resolved, 
except in rare but highly conspicuous instances, by the force of arms. The disputes are being 
resolved by negotiation and accommodation, with international lawyers playing important roles. 
Legal arguments are being heard and they are making a difference, even though they are not 
often heard formally in courts such as the ICJ. Fourth, and lastly, one might account for the 
increasing role of international law in the world affairs today by claiming that positivists are 
right after all, except that they have looked for sanctions in the wrong place. Instead of highly 
visible punitive sanctions, international law today is largely enforced through a spectrum of steps 
short of acts of warfare. All kinds of harassment might follow upon a nation's violation of an 
international rule; moreover there will be legal retaliation. (You've broken one rule, we'll break 
another) or economic retaliation (You've broken a rule, we'll raise tariffs solely against [pg88]  
your country).FN9 Let us revert for a moment to the parent establishing a rule for a child; the 
parent need not spank the child, for many other measures of disapproval are possible. The parent 
might withdraw some expected reward, or the parent might simply express displeasure, which a 
well-raised child might find to be as much of a sanction as another child might find physical 
punishment. But as the notion of sanction becomes attenuated, even conceding that thus it 
becomes more realistic, it begins to depart from the positivist model. If a parent's mere 
annoyance that a child has broken a rule constitutes a sufficient sanction in the eyes of the child, 
we may properly ask whether this is a sanction at all or whether it is merely an inherent attribute 
of law or authority. Most citizens obeys most laws—even laws that are morally neutral such as 
obeying a traffic signal—not because they calculate the odds of being caught and penalized but 
almost reflexively, as if not to do something which the state has rightly said should not be done. 
Additionally, the notions of legal retaliation and harassment may not themselves be a full 
explanation for the sanction theory, since many people believe that two wrongs do not make a 
right. If nation A allegedly violates international law, we do not automatically expect nation B to 
demonstrate A's violation by in turn doing something illegal. In other words, we do not wait for 
B's sanction to determine whether A has violated the law. Rather, we simply expect B to respond 
that A has violated the law—and it doesn't even matter that B in fact does make such a response. 
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The expectation of such a response undoubtedly deters many nations in A's position from 
violating the law in the first instance. 
  
 If we can conclude that an objective reality called international law is increasingly 
important as a factor in helping to modify conduct in the world community—or, what amounts to 
the same thing, to structure the range of possible alternatives so that only some courses of action 
appear reasonable and legal—we must next turn to the substance of the relationship between 
international law and the naturalist and positivist theories that are so important in determining its 
content. In the preceding chapter Professor Onuf considered these relations largely from a 
historical viewpoint. Within that general context, let us look at the relationships analytically. 
 
The Opposing Viewpoints of Positivism and Naturalism  
 
 I want to argue in this section that positivism and naturalism represent fundamentally 
opposing epistemologies; and in the next section I will contend that international law today 
reflects, and necessarily absorbs, the naturalist position. 
 
 Although historically it might appear that positivism was a nineteenth century 
Benthamite-Austinian movement in jurisprudence, in fact a positivist perspective is implicit in 
the writings of Plato and St. Augustine and even to some extent in the writings of the "father of 
natural law" St. Thomas Aquinas.FN10 Positivism is more than an insistence upon the 
importance of sanctions as suggested earlier in this chapter; it is more than the "command" 
theory of law of John Austin or subsequent refinements as outlined by Professor Gnuf in the 
preceding chapter. Rather, at the essence of positivism is a world outlook that might be described 
as existential—a denial of imminent [pg89] purposiveness, an emphasis on the present fact of 
existence no matter how absurd those facts might seem to be. A legal positivist believes that a 
rule is or is not a rule of law, and if it is a rule of law, then what it commands, however absurdly, 
gives rise to a legal obligation. Lon L. Fuller once suggested an example that indicates this point 
clearly: a statute is enacted which contains the word not preceding its operative paragraph, 
rendering the entire statute meaningless or exceptionally misleading and frustrating to anyone 
purporting to divine its command.FN11 A court believing in naturalism might take the position  
that the word not was included by error either when the bill was read before the legislature or 
later when it was printed in the public code, and thus strike out the word. But a positivist court 
could not do so, no matter how absurd the consequences, because a positivist court would 
investigate only whether the statute was validly enacted.FN12 If valid, it must be enforced as 
written; only the legislature can later "remedy the mischief" if mischief there be. Positivism does 
not require a court or an interpretive body to make sense out of law, but merely to apply it as 
enacted. Nor does positivism place any requirement upon the legislature; the latter may enact 
anything into law provided it is in fact the legislature validly engaged in enacting rules. A 
legislature may enact nonsensical, or impossible, or retroactive laws; it may enact some laws but 
keep their contents secret from the public; it has total license to command, and a court is required 
to apply its commands as dictated by the words of the statute and not any extrinsic test of 
meaning. Positivism, in short, is a special kind of theory of meaning; it takes the denotations of  
words and asks for strict application. It treats legal rules as it would treat electronic  
commands fed into a computer. The computer must obey the commands exactly, with no  
attempt to omit a word such as not or to change the meaning of any words. (Of course, a  
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computer may be programmed to correct for certain errors; but it is nevertheless  
commanded to obey the program without correcting the program for errors. In other  
words, the computer is not human.)FN13  
 
 An entirely different view of the world is suggested in the teleological philosophy of 
Aristotle, taken up in the bulk of the writings of St. Thomas, and fed decisively into international 
law by Pufendorf and Grotius. This nonexistential view of law is that the law must make sense as 
applied to human behavior. A rule of law is something that is enacted by humans in order to 
fulfill certain human purposes. The purposes, or ends, are really what is important; the law is 
merely a means to their attainment. Hence a statute that obviously contains a mistake can be 
corrected by a court. A law that commands people to do the impossible, or that is self-
contradictory, or that is deliberately kept secret from those to whom it is purportedly addressed, 
is not entitled to be interpreted as law by any body, such as a court, that is charged with applying 
it. A naturalist does not equate courts with computers; he does not strive for realization of the 
words of the law at the expense of its purpose to regulate and order the relationships among 
people. A naturalist is a peculiarly human interpreter of law; he assumes that the law does not 
exist [pg90] for itself but rather is a means toward the attainment of human ends. A naturalist 
must deny the strictly causal theories of some scientists who assert that only material events can 
precede other highly correlated material events. As Professor Taylor has shown, a teleologist (or 
for our purposes, a naturalist) necessarily assumes that a future event (an end) influences in the 
present a line of conduct.FN14 This can only happen for thinking beings who have a vision of an 
end they want to reach and who use that vision to shape their interpretation of various means that 
are presented to them. Thus, purposiveness becomes a part of law-interpretation and hence of 
law-content. The existentialist-positivist, on the other hand, adopts a strictly material causal 
philosophy, insisting that rules of law be interpreted only according to the present denotative 
meanings of the words in those rules irrespective of consequences. 
  
 Reduced to their essentials, positivism and naturalism thus proceed from two 
contradictory views of the world: men as machines acting out what could be an absurd drama, 
and men as teleological beings concerned with future consequences of alternative courses of 
conduct. While the notion of men as machines may today sound pejorative, in fact for the past 
three hundred years this picture has been the dominant philosophy in legal circles due to a certain 
intrinsic attractiveness that it possesses over the naturalist view. One aspect of this attraction is 
the certainty and efficiency of the positivist view: why allow a court to second guess a legislature 
when the result may be more "common law confusion" of that type that Bentham excoriated? 
FN15 Another aspect is the apparent scientific quality of positivism: here, at last, is a pure 
science which, according to Kelsen and other enthusiasts, could finally be made objective. FN16 
Recent years have seen many positivist theorists trying to account for the loose ends in the 
framework of scientific positivism; though reality seemed elusive, they hoped that by further 
refining positivist theory all the disconcerting facts of law as actually applied by human beings 
might be brought within the positivist framework. A final aspect of the attraction of positivist 
theory is that it promised to divorce any commentator's own views of what the law should be 
from his description of the law that is. Here, at least, is an important and significant endeavor, 
but perhaps one need not embrace positivism to ensure its fulfillment. By exercising great care—
more than a positivist writer need exercise—a naturalist-oriented writer can still divorce his own 
predilections from his description of the law that exists, even though his description of the 
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objective existing law necessarily includes purposive-oriented standards of the law that ought to 
be.  
 
 Historically, positivism certainly corrected the common law excesses of naturalism as 
ridiculed by Bentham.FN17 In this sense it was and has been a healthy corrective. But I want to 
argue next that present-day international law reflects. the naturalist and not the positivist 
perspective, and that this reflection has great substantive significance. 
 
Natural Law and International Law 
 
 The notion of teleology in naturalism is more than an empty formality to the effect that 
perceived future purposes can guide present actions. The historical development of  [pg91] 
natural law contributes the essential substantive fact that human purpose is everywhere pretty 
much the same, that people strive for (roughly) the same basic values, and that the meanings we 
can attribute to norms of international law make sense in the same sort of way to widely 
divergent peoples in developed and developing nations alike. Were it not for the essential 
sameness of human nature, so insisted upon by St. Thomas and assumed in the writings of Myres 
McDougal and his associates,FN18 natural law would be deflated into existentialism, with a 
person becoming a purposeless being in a world that may be absurd. Natural law is a non-
arbitrary set of human standards that retains its meaning for all people at all times in all places. 
Its claim is, for this reason, arrogant; but the opposite claim sells humanity short. 
 
 The increasing assertion of human rights against the depredations of governments is an 
example of substantive natural law in the international legal arena.FN19 Natural law combines 
two great substantive principles: the goal of survival of the human species, and justice to 
individuals. Any artificial entity, such as a state, that stands in the way of the attainment of these 
principles is contrary to natural law (as the greatest philosopher of the state as an entity—
Hegel—fully realized in his strictures against natural law). The relation of the state to the 
naturalist needs of the world community will be more fully considered in the next part of this 
chapter.  
 
 It is instructive to note that anyone's list of basic human rights is invariably universal in 
its claim. Equality under the law or freedom of speech or the rights of women, for example, are 
not claimed for a particular region or a collection of states in a certain economic classification; 
rather, these and other human rights are asserted to apply to all people wherever situated. The 
push toward universality in such claims is a natural concomitant of the naturalist perspective. If 
law itself does not mean arbitrarily different things in different places, under naturalist theory, 
then certainly rights and freedoms should also be grounded in universality. 
 
 St. Thomas talked about "right reason" as the meaning to be given to natural law.FN20 
His scope was global; by "right" he did not mean "right only in the context of Western Europe 
during the Middle Ages." And "reason" was not the exclusive province of Churchmen (no 
wonder that true natural law was a subversive doctrine insofar as the Catholic Church was 
concerned, the Church after St. Thomas emphasizing the primacy of "Divine Law" and canon 
law over the dictates of right reason). The tendency toward universality is probably inherent in 
any contemplation of the right as distinct from the expedient course of action for any person to 
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take. If something is right, it is right in all similar contexts whatever the time or place. Surely 
killing another person for private gain is wrong throughout the world; regardless of the wide 
variances in cultures, we can still recognize murder when we see it, and we can distinguish it 
even from tribal sacrificial rites or state executions of criminals or self-defense. But what about 
abortion? Is that murder? Didn't St. Thomas so hold? Doesn't the abortion example prove the 
non-universality of so-called natural law? What if the right to abortion were to appear on a 
United Nations list of basic human rights? 
 
 We must relate abortion, as any other substantive claim, to the two fundamental natural 
law principles: perpetuation of the species and justice to the individual. In St. [pg92] Thomas' 
time, there was a perceived threat of underpopulation to the future of the human race. Indeed, 
seventy-five years after his death, the plague decimated Europe. In that context, abortion was a 
crime against the future survival of the human race. Today, perceptions are quite the opposite: 
the threat to human survival is more a matter of overpopulation than underpopulation. Far from 
being a threat to human survival, abortion today may be an aid to the future of human life on this 
planet. But we can well imagine a future where nuclear devastation has left few survivors, and in 
such a context abortion again might be linked to future survivability and hence be prohibited by 
"right reason."  
 
 But medieval strictures against abortion have had an important psychological effect, 
which today is manifested in the feeling of the sacredness of human life. This feeling too is very 
important to the survival of the species. Much of this feeling is manifested by the anti-
abortionists, and even those who disagree with their position must concede that the anti-
abortionists are not acting out of selfish or hedonistic motives but rather are articulating a basic 
feeling of the sacredness of life that might tend to be downgraded in an overpopulated world. 
(Studies of animal overpopulation invariably show behavior that becomes predicated on the 
pervasive assumption that life is cheap and reproduction is unnecessary.) Thus a U.N. right-to-
abortion plank might be counter-productive in downgrading the sacredness of life at the same 
time that it would be productive in asserting the rights of women and helping to reduce global 
overpopulation. We can only conclude that the abortion issue is necessarily complex, but 
certainly does not destroy the universality of the claim that what is paramount is the survival of 
the species. 
 
 Focusing upon species survival also brings out the relevance of environmental protection 
in the international law context. Persons or governments have no right ,to destroy the life 
sustaining environment or permanently deplete it of, for example, an animal or plant species; 
such actions endanger the future survivability of the human race. Often in the short-term, even if 
measured by the life span of an individual, environment-depleting actions can be economically 
profitable (even to the point that it would not pay others to deter such actions.) Only natural 
law—and the effect it is having upon substantive international law—may stand as a realistic 
deterrent to such actions.FN21 
 
 Professor Falk has well described the fundamental disparities among peoples today and 
the challenges faced by the world community.FN22 There is an extremely unequal distribution 
of wealth. Nuclear armaments are stockpiled that can destroy all life forms forever. The world is 
overpopulated and many are starving to death. Our natural environment is being poisoned and 
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resources necessary to organic life are wantonly exploited. And superimposed upon all these 
problems is the nation-state system, where governments pursue narrowly defined bureaucratic 
values often at the expense of the people. Such governments can no longer be changed by the 
threat of war, for nuclear war against any major government will equally destroy victor and 
vanquished. All that is left is law and, perhaps, right reason. But international law as we know it 
is largely state dominated. Its subject-creators traditionally have been nations, not persons. And 
while we are seeing a transition from states as exclusive subjects of international law to people 
increasingly obtaining international legal rights, described by Professor Onuf in the preceding 
chapter, we still are faced with the problem that traditional international law might be unable to 
meet world needs because it assumes subject entities that are nations and not persons.  
 
[pg93] Nations as Subject-Creators of International Law: The Basic Context 
 
 International law suggests a system of laws between and among nations; in this classic 
view, states are the creator-subjects of that legal system. But there are other logical possibilities. 
Mankind might have refused to recognize all artificial entities; international law could have 
meant, simply, the law governing transactions among individuals across national frontiers (the 
nations, in this case, not constituting separate legal entities but merely names for aggregations of 
individuals in geographic areas). Present international law Seems to be on the road to 
recognizing individual actions as part of international adjudication in limited areas such as the 
European Court of Human Rights. Another possibility would be to recognize artificial 
international entities other than states-multinational corporations and intergovernmental 
organizations, for example. A more revolutionary approach would be the extreme form of 
functionalism described by David MitranyFN23 where all governmental functions are performed 
by international agencies and bureaucracies, that presumably then would be the sole subjects of 
international law. The above possibilities are generally conceived at the substate level, but other 
possible forms of international legal interaction could occur supranationally: regionalism (a 
region might include states and parts of states) and world organizations, both of which could 
impose law downward upon states and people. As Professor Onuf has remarked in the first 
chapter, the present system is dominated by the relations of states even though writers disagree 
about how significant an inroad has been made by other forms. 
 
 How do these various forms relate to the overwhelming problems confronting mankind 
today: environmental degradation and the threat of total nuclear war? How do they relate to other 
problems that may not involve destruction of the human species but just as seriously affect the 
meaning of life: human freedoms and rights, relief from overpopulation, freedom from hunger 
and severe poverty? A natural law perspective would hold that a rational relation between the 
forms of the legal system and the basic needs of mankind is more than a desideratum; it is a 
necessity. Yet two enormous tasks impend: First, we must attempt to solve the theoretical 
problem of determining what forms, in detail, are most rationally related to the solution of these 
problems; second, people and their governments must be persuaded to operationalize these 
forms. No matter how hopeless or utopian this second task of persuasion might seem, we cannot 
even undertake it without first solving the theoretical problem. 
 
 The remaining chapters in this book are addressed to aspects of the various forms, present 
and emerging, that constitute the international legal system. My task in the rest of this chapter 
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involves a partial examination of the first and most traditional form of international law, that 
involving states as subject-creators. I will be concerned primarily with mechanisms of law-
creation among states, but some preliminary consideration might usefully be given here to the 
concept of state in political philosophy and its potential relevance to the basic challenges to 
human survival on this small planet. 
 
 Four possible notions of a state are as follows:  
(1) A state is nothing at all; it is a mere word giving a name to all the people within a defined geographic 
area.  
 
(2) A state is an entity independent of the people within it; it is a force in itself; it is a right in Hegel's sense.  
 
[pg94] (3) A state represents more than people in a geographic area, because it represents the human 
species—dead people (tradition in Burke's sense), living people, and potential people.  
 
(4) A state represents not only past, present, and future persons, but also a symbiotic tie between these 
people and the land they live on (exemplified in the writings of, among others, Mazzini). Under this view, 
people living in one state would become different people if they migrated to a different state.  
 
 The first possibility might be labelled as liberal in today's terms, the second reactionary. 
Perhaps without states we would not be in a position today to fear thermonuclear destruction. On 
the other hand, if nuclear weapons were invented in a nationless world, certain individuals might 
obtain a monopoly and terrorize everyone else. In short, we must not confuse theories of how 
mankind got into its present predicament with rational solutions for getting out of it. Now that 
nuclear weapons are stockpiled that can destroy all life and continue to "make the rubble 
bounce," are they best controlled by a state system or by some other kind of system? Perhaps a 
state in the third sense given above might have a collective rationality greater than that of 
individuals. An individual, after all, could believe in taking the world down with him—après 
moi, le déluge. But a number of governmental officials, some of whom have families, might not 
think the same way. Perhaps there is conservatism in collectivity. Similarly, with respect to 
environmental degradation, it is not at all clear that governments will act less responsibly than 
other entities, including persons or multinational corporations or regional associations. There is 
cause for great despair at the lack of progress among governments in stemming the destruction of 
species such as whales, in reversing global air pollution or destruction of the stratospheric ozone 
layer, or in checking the population explosion; yet would other forms of legal organization 
behave any better; and if there are any, how are they better? These questions are not rhetorical; 
obviously much thought has to be addressed to them in the years ahead. 
 
 My limited task here is to show that some degree of rationality, at least, results from the 
fact that international law is not created out of the whims of individual states (their policies, their 
unilateral declarations, their claims) but rather is created out of interstate relations. Since states 
try to survive, and since their survival is predicated on some minimal degree of order, their 
interactions—forming universal customary law—will normally be rational in the natural law 
sense of being purposive. 
 
 My discussion will be in terms of a referent—that of a logical validator of what assertions 
"count" as rules of the system. This attempt to search for a mechanism is prompted by a natural 
law perspective, for the mechanism presumes that states do not act arbitrarily and that their 
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interactions reflect a consensus about mutually desirable rules. To say this much is not to assert 
that the present international system is capable of solving the problems of environmental 
degradation and thermonuclear destruction but rather simply to examine what the capabilities 
might be in a formal sense. Let us, therefore, turn to an examination of the mechanism for 
generating interstate rules. 
 
THE RELATION OF RULES TO STATES 
 
 International law is more than a communication that affects state behavior. It also defines 
international reality. The law tells states when they are injured; states feel no pain and hence 
have to be told when they are hurt. The law also tells states what appropriate responses may be 
made to such injuries. Law defines the scope of a nation's legitimate interests—its entitlements. 
A nation may want many things that it is not entitled to have—e.g., to import inexpensive oil, to 
have exclusive fishing rights to the Atlantic Ocean, to add to its territory at the expense of 
neighboring nations. But only its [pg95] entitlements as defined by international law constitute 
claims which, if not recognized by other states, tend reciprocally to adversely affect the 
entitlements of those other states. Finally, international law erects a structural perspective for 
interpreting international claim conflicts. 
 
 The competing interests of states inevitably clash in the international arena. International 
law in the first instance serves as a sort of signal to tell states which of these clashes are 
acceptable and which are deserving of retaliation. A mental experiment may help illustrate this 
function of law. State A is wealthier and militarily more powerful than its neighbor state B. 
If both states need to import oil but state A consistently outbids state B for the oil so that most of 
the short supply goes to A and not B, state B normally would have no justifiable complaint 
against A and would not attempt any retaliatory measures outside of possible economic 
retaliation. If state B were to commit a hostile act against A—e.g., imprisoning 100 of state A's 
nationals resident in B until state A lowers its bid price for the oil—we can well imagine that A's 
reaction would not be to lower its bid price but rather, perhaps, to imprison 120 of state B's 
nationals resident in A. In short, B has reacted inappropriately to A's economic aggression by an 
illegal act; A's economic aggression was not illegal but B's act of imprisonment was illegal and 
was perceived to be illegal by A which retaliated in kind. If B were then to retaliate again by an 
even greater illegality, B could only expect another round of retaliation in kind. This no-win 
strategy is probably why we would not ordinarily expect B to engage in an illegal retaliation for 
A's legal initial action.  
 
 Now let us change the situation by supposing that A, having cornered the supply of oil, 
decides to drop some bombs on B's few domestic oilfields. The bombing is clearly an illegal act 
that would engender retaliation by B. Even though A is militarily the more powerful state, it 
would probably refrain from committing such an overt unprovoked act against B. The sheer 
illegality of the act would undoubtedly transform B into a tougher opponent than B was on 
paper, for B would feel justified in fighting back, her citizens aroused, whereas A's citizens 
might be reluctant to fight very hard in such an unjustified cause. Of course, actual wars are 
never so simple, and nations can fight for what seem in retrospect to be unjustified causes. But I 
am trying to show why a great many potential wars never get fought. They do not arise because 




 A final point needs to be made about this thought experiment. A's initial cornering of the 
oil supply might have had extremely deleterious consequences for B; perhaps many more 
citizens of B starved to death due to the lack of oil to power farm machinery than the 120 
citizens that might be hurt if B started a chain of retaliation. Yet the amount of real suffering 
visited upon a nation is no test of legality. In the present world at the present time, international 
law tells us that it is legal for one nation to outbid another in the international oil market, but is it 
is illegal for one nation to imprison the nationals of another nation without legal cause. State B 
may feel much more pain from a legal economic attack than from an illegal physical attack, yet 
the law tells B that the legal pain is not a pain at all but the illegal physical injury, however 
slight, is justification for retaliation or resort to third-party intervention.  
 
 What underlies this strange set of legal injuries that states experience? We should 
examine the fundamental structural assumptions of the international legal system. Perhaps one of 
the best ways to get a perspective of that system is to take some of the central assumptions of 
international law and imagine what the world would be like without them. If successful, this 
exercise in imagination will do more than give us an analytical perspective. It will help narrow 
the class of purported international norms that [pg96] cannot become rules of law because they 
do not share the basic characteristics of international law as we have come to know it.  
 
 One of the most basic and deep-rooted postulates of international law is that of the 
sovereign equality of nations. Suppose, instead, that international law had evolved differently. 
Suppose the law reflected accurately the differences in the armed might of the various nations. 
The law would give more rights and privileges to the stronger nation, and fewer to the weaker 
nation. The United States and the Soviet Union might have, say, an exclusive fisheries coastal 
zone of 200 miles, Canada 100 miles, Chile and Mexico 50 miles each, and Costa Rica 25 miles. 
Of course this result seems strange, but its strangeness is because we are all conditioned to 
accept the notion of legal equality. In particular, the most powerful states naturally assume in 
negotiations such as the Law of the Sea Conferences that whatever the breadth of contiguous 
zones may be adopted, the breadth will be the same for all coastal states. In this, among many 
ways, the notion of equality of states under international law is a powerful force operating to the 
advantage of weaker states. When newly emerging and third-world states claim that international 
law was invented by European powers for their own interests and that norms of international law 
can be freely accepted or rejected by the new 'nations, they are essentially taking a doctrinal 
position for bargaining purposes that they might reject if they stood the chance of losing all the 
benefits of international law. 
  
 Another basic characteristic of international law is that any rule in the system must 
prohibit at least certain kinds of actions. A rule of law means that the actor must refrain from 
doing something that he otherwise might have been inclined to do. Sometimes writers cast their 
nets so broadly as to include within international law everything that states do; the result is to 
find law everywhere, but at the great loss of making it impossible for any state to violate the law. 
This supererogatory result is sometimes found in the writings of Professor McDougal and his 
associates when the claim appears to be made that if certain states share the proper values and act 
with the proper motives, everything they do is legal.FN24 On the opposite extreme, some writers 
claim that the laws of warfare are not true laws of international law because they seem to have 
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little if any power in fact to prohibit the actor from doing what he wants to do in a wartime 
situation.FN25 But this view is probably erroneous both from a factual and a theoretical 
perspective. Factually, the laws of war like any other laws indicate what initiatives are legal and 
hence subject to legal retaliation, and what initiatives are illegal and hence open up extreme, 
impassioned, and sometimes unrestrained retaliation, Even in the bitterest wars there are 
hundreds if not thousands of understood reciprocal restraints in small and large matters affecting 
both sides. These restraints are keyed around perceived legalities and illegalities of the conduct 
of warfare. Of course, the restraints sometimes break down, hut. even in domestic law not all 
laws are always enforced by prosecutors, and certainly all laws are not always obeyed (the rising 
crime rate does not mean that criminal laws are losing their status as legal prohibitions).FN26 
And from a theoretical standpoint, positivists in the Austinian tradition,  particularly Kelsen, 
have insisted upon finding [pg97] some sanction behind all laws. These writers find it 
particularly difficult to deal with the laws of war because in a war there is a breakdown of an 
authoritative sanction-source to enforce laws. FN27 What these writers seemed to have failed to 
appreciate is the consequence of viewing law as a set of words. The words of law that specify 
primary delicts are not unlike the words of law that command those who would enforce the law. 
A prosecutor in domestic law can violate the law that commands him to prosecute murderers just 
as the murderer can violate the primary law against homicide. But if the prosecutor decides not 
to prosecute—even if he announces that he will no longer prosecute any criminal matters—we 
do not say that there are no longer any primary laws against crime. A crime is still a crime; 
someday some official might attach a penalty to it. Similarly, in wartime, the failure, no matter 
how widespread, to enforce certain laws of warfare does not mean that these laws have vanished. 
Their violation is always potentially capable of being penalized—after the war, or as retaliation 
during the war. What is significant is that the law has characterized the event, and in thus 
characterizing it, has said that a future sanction could legally be applied to it. This is all that law, 
as a set of words, can ever do. What actually happens as a consequence of the violation of legal 
norms is by and large a matter of post-legal behavior.FN28 
 
 An important consequence of the view that international law minimally prohibits certain 
classes of actions is that we should view critically any claim that unilateral declarations of law 
are per se evidence of what the law is.FN29 A nation may claim anything; it may make a claim 
for something that is patently illegal just to see whether other nations will let it get away with the 
claim. Similarly, an attorney general's opinion is not evidence of the content of international law, 
nor is a nation's pleadings in an international dispute (obviously there are two sides to a dispute 
and both cannot be right). The tendency of some writers to amass claims of all sorts—often those 
made in an international forum such as the United Nations—and use these as evidence of 
international law can paint a misleading picture of the content of international law. Indeed, it is 
probably not too great an exaggeration to say that most statements by nations (including their 
diplomatic speeches and writings, foreign office correspondence, attorney general opinions, 
writings of their own establishment of international legal scholars, and public mass-media 
speeches) are carefully contrived for the purpose of eliciting advantage in the vast process of 
international negotiation, and are not—even though many purport to be—restatements of 
international law. If anything an interested party says is evidence of law, then international law 




 Finally, let us consider a third basic postulate of international law: the unidimensionality 
of rules. It is characteristic of rules that, where they apply, they apply completely and fully to 
that and to similar factual situations. Rules do not arbitrarily apply sometimes to the same factual 
situations; nor do they require a mere attempt at compliance or give the affected state discretion 
whether or not to obey them. Conceivably we could have had [pg98] other dimensions to rules, 
giving them the character of weights which may or may not be taken into account. To some 
extent, the notion of "principles of law" as formulated by Ronald DworkinFN30 and as reflected 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of JusticeFN31 applies as a weight to be 
added into the balance in international decision-making. But rules or norms of law must be 
sharply distinguished from principles. As to rules or norms, the only important question is 
whether or not they are rules of the system of international law. Of course, we may have so 
called emerging rules of the system whose status is uncertain. But as to the latter, the debate is 
whether the rule has or has not arrived; significantly, the debate never is addressed to a 
compromise position that would accord to the rule a half-status between law and non-law. We 
would not know what to do with a rule in this grey area. Nations want to know whether or not 
they are currently bound by an alleged rule of international law. The line between law and non-
law is crucially significant in international law. Our task, then, is to try to specify how the line is 
to be drawn. Of all the alleged rules and norms that on their face could be rules of international 
law, how do we select the smaller set of rules that actually are rules of that system? 
 
An Objective Validator of International Law  
 
 Prior to the nineteenth century it hardly occurred to anyone to desire an objective test for 
determining what was the law and what was not the law. The law—whether municipal or 
international—was rooted in immemorial custom, in natural law, in eternal principles, and in 
reason. If there was a dispute, a judge would decide the question, his decision contributing to the 
clarity of the law in its restatement of what everyone should have known anyway. But legislative 
reform gave the impetus to a rethinking of validating procedures for the law. Bentham's desire to 
change the content of the common law through legislation led him naturally to question the 
authenticity of the common law.FN32 Austin, who did not share Bentham's antipathy to the 
common law, nevertheless theorized that the common law owed its efficacy only to its being 
adopted by the sovereign.FN33 Breaking from the centuries-old tradition that the law was 
binding on everyone, Austin, doing for law what Bodin and Hobbes had done for political 
philosophy, posited a sovereign who was above the law and under whom law existed through his 
sufferance. The sovereign became the objective validator of all law; what he commanded, or 
allowed, was law; nothing was law that was contrary to his commands. Finding his view of law 
inapplicable to the international arena because of the difficulty of locating a sovereign there, 
Austin redefined international law as not being law but mere "positive morality. FN34  
 
 But the simple mechanism of a sovereign being the objective validator of law even in 
domestic systems increasingly was shown to be deficient. First, laws that defined and accounted 
for the succession of sovereigns could not themselves be sovereign commands. [pg99] Second, 
in some systems it became very hard to locate the sovereign at all. Attempting to cope with this 
latter difficulty, Hart has posited the idea of the sovereignty of a "rule of recognition."FN35 But I 
think that Hart's solution will eventually fail for the same reasons as Austin's. In the first place, 
Hart cannot account for changes in the rule of recognition or in its replacement by a successor 
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rule. Secondly, in some systems the rule is fairly clear (as in states with a written constitution) 
but in some it seems so diffuse and so rooted in common law and custom that the rule is too 
broad to be helpful in its avowed purpose as serving as an objective validator.FN36 
 
 If Hart's conceptualization eventually fails for the latter reason, he nevertheless has 
forcefully reminded us of the necessity for finding secondary rules in a legal system that account 
for the creation and change of the primary rules. This is no less important internationally than 
domestically. The set of international secondary rules that one might—if one feels the need—call 
the international rule of recognition has usually been discussed under the misleading term 
sources of law. The sources of international law do not form a closed set; there is nothing to 
prevent the community of nations from someday recognizing a new authoritative source. The 
open-endedness of the possible sources or validators of international law does not make it any 
the less law than Godel's proof of the open-endedness of any mathematical system of an order of 
complexity that would include the real numbers has made mathematics any the less 
mathematical. 
 
 Consensus. One alleged validator of international rules is the consensus of states. We 
have come to know the term consensus as denoting that situation where a rule or policy is 
proposed and no one actively opposes it. Some may abstain from voting or may not be willing to 
endorse the group decision, but a consensus may. still obtain. But consensus is not the same as a 
majority vote. There is no international mechanism for creating rules by majority of states 
through some sort of legislative process. For example, a resolution directed against South Africa 
in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and actively opposed by South Africa, is not in 
itself a rule of law by virtue of the consensus ofstates.FN37 Of course, the resolution might 
reflect already existing law, but then it would be the existing law and not the resolution that 
counts. As much as nations might want to transform General Assembly resolutions into law, we 
must acknowledge at this state of world law that one actively opposed dissenter is enough to 
destroy the consensus. The General Assembly may, in Professor Falk's term, have quasi-
legislative competence, but this is not the same as legislative competence.FN38  
 
 Nearly all rules of international law at present enjoy the status of law by virtue of the 
consensus of states over time. We tend to regard the settled rules of international law as those 
rules that are not actively opposed by a state or group of states. Sometimes the consensus has not 
been derived by reference to the specific rule itself but to the other kinds of validators (such as 
custom) which themselves are a product of the consensus of states. But consensus is not a very 
useful mechanism for introducing new laws directly because adversely affected states can 
actively oppose such rules.FN39 Proposed rules that [pg100] adversely affect the important 
interests of states will not be adopted by the international community through any sort of 
consensus mechanism. On the other hand, clarificatory rules and those which progressively 
develop the content of international law are becoming incorporated into the body of international 
norms through the slow and patient work of groups such as the International Law Commission. 
By soliciting comments from states, these international groups engaged in progressive 
development of the law often achieve consensus on a large number of proposed restatements of 




 Clearly the most important function of consensus is in its validation of the other 
validators. The secondary rules relating to custom, treaty, decisions of courts, and so forth, are 
the product of the consensus of nations and hence are the most significant means for changing 
old norms and creating new ones. 
 
 Custom. The workability of custom as a validator of international rules stems  
primarily from a nation's actions being far more conservative than its claims, desires,  
threats, responses, and wishes. A nation might desire exclusive fishing rights to the  
Atlantic Ocean; it might make a claim to a large area of that ocean; it might even issue a  
legal opinion that it owns the fish in the ocean. But these wishes are not translated into  
reality; the nation does not attempt to bar all other fishing vessels from the Atlantic  
Ocean. Hence it was early perceived that a nation's actions in the international arena are a  
far better guide to the underlying rules of law than its claims or its desires. When we  
sum all nations' actions, we have a fairly good view of the implicit principles that channel  
such actions in certain directions and not in others. Custom is grounded on this material 
component of action (or abstention from action). 
 
 But not everything a nation does or does not do constitutes custom in the  
international sense. When a nation taxes its own resident nationals it is not creating an  
international rule of taxation; although Kelsen theorized that international law permits  
such taxation, his argument was only a theoretical construct to the effect that everything  
not prohibited by international law is permitted by it.FN40 When a nation extends a mere  
courtesy to another nation (e.g., by displaying the other nation's flag on one of its city  
streets), such an action does not form part of custom so that a rule is developed requiring  
the nation to display the flag forever.FN41 Thus, to formulate a rule of customary 
law, we must have both an act (the material component) and a characterization of that act (the  
 [pg101] qualitative or psychological component) as a norm of international law. I have 
attempted to spell out these factors elsewhere and would not want to repeat them here.FN42 
However, I would note a dissent to Professor Onuf’s view in the preceding chapterFN43 that the 
only characterization or articulation of an act that international customary rules require is to  
indicate which acts are not law so that all the rest of them can generate rules of law. To  
my mind this would present an unnecessary burden on states to continually characterize  
harmless acts as non-law (e.g., if a statesman signs a treaty with a fountain pen, he would  
need to announce that he is doing so only as a matter of courtesy and not with a view to  
generating a future law that will require the use of fountain pens if treaties are to be validly 
signed). Of course, maybe states someday will welcome such a burden, but until they do, all that 
Custom as a validator of rules of law seems to require is a positive articulation and not Professor 
Onuf’s less restrictive negative disclaimer. 
 
 The articulation of an act as formative of a customary rule need not come from the  
acting state; what is minimally required is that states be put on notice of the articulation.  
Sometimes scholars can playa crucial role in the formation of customary law by writings  
which amount to an articulation of a rule. A possible example is Professor Falk's  
characterization of the three types of violent conflict in civil strife.FN44 In an area as complex  
as irregular warfare, such an organizing principle might suddenly clarify what had previously 
appeared to be divergent practices and suggest an implicit rule of customary law that the actions 
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of states involved in civil strife were in fact substantiating. Inasmuch as Professor Falk's views 
were published during the Vietnam War, his articulation was contemporaneous with the acts 
themselves. It is too early to tell whether, in this particular case, new customary rules of 
universal validity were set in motion that will affect the way nations will react in the future to 
civil strife. 
 
 Treaties. Treaties and other international agreements tend to supply the bulk of  
articulations of rules.FN45 Moreover, entering into a treaty is an act of a state, a legal  
commitment to act or refrain from acting in a treaty-specified way. As a result, treaty  
rules tend to become rules of customary international law (unless opposed by contrary  
rules in other treaties).FN46 A treaty that creates a particular law for the parties is thus also  
an instrument for the universalization of rules, not by virtue of what the parties intend  
(because all they presumably intend to do is to make an agreement between themselves)  
but by virtue of international perceptions about the rule-generating ability of treaty  
provisions.FN47  
 
 [pg102] Judicial Decisions. Despite an uneven performance through the years and a 
noticeably uncrowded docket, the International Court of Justice is perhaps the closest thing we 
have to a tangible objective validator of rules. Its opinions are greatly respected and frequently 
cited by states. Its judges today are more representative of the community of all nations than in 
the past, but whether its caseload will expand is problematical. 
  
 Other international Courts of all kinds are feeder streams into the river of international 
law. Can we include domestic courts as well, when they deal with international questions? 
Professor Falk argues that we should, but in chapter 1 Professor Onuf indicates that such courts 
are on a par with a unilateral opinion of a nation. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between. 
Professor Onuf is right insofar as he is pointing out that a domestic court does not contribute to 
the development of international law merely by saying that it is applying international law. But 
any court does more than issue an opinion; it issues a decision. The decision itself can affect 
international interests, and if erroneous can lead to retaliation by the foreign state. The decision, 
moreover, embodies a concession for reciprocal treatment when a similar case comes up in a 
foreign nation's domestic court system. In these respects, decisions of domestic courts involving 
international questions directly contribute to the form of international rules by the process of 
custom. The decisions are acts of states containing, in the accompanying opinions, their own 
articulation. 
 
 Hence, we might conclude that the International Court of Justice, by virtue of its 
acknowledgement by states, is itself a validator of international norms, whereas domestic courts 
(which of course have no such international acknowledgement) may make their greatest 
contribution by the operation of a previously discussed objective validator, namely, custom. 
 
 General Principles of Law. To Professor Onuf’s analysis in chapter 1 on "general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" (as found in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice), I would like to add an observation based upon Professor 
Dworkin's work that has not yet been applied to international studies. Professor Dworkin has 
shown that there is something fundamentally different between a principle and a rule. FN48 A 
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principle is entitled to a certain weight in the consideration of a decision, whereas a rule points to 
an unambiguous result. A rule either applies or it doesn't apply; if it applies, it is decisive. But a 
principle may apply and yet be overshadowed by other [pg103] principles. The principle "no 
man should profit by his own wrong" is one that is found in most domestic legal systems, yet it 
can be overshadowed in domestic law by, for example, the principle of quieting title to real estate 
in a case involving adverse possession (where the adverse possessor clearly profits from his own 
wrong). The principle that tends to invalidate contracts achieved by coercion does not apply to 
treaties of peace between two states that were previously at war; here another principle, namely 
the avoidance of further violence, validates unequal peace treaties. In the law of war, competing 
principles are military necessity and humanitarianism, and, as Quincy Wright pointed out,FN49 
the principle of ending the war quickly and the principle of securing a just and lasting peace (the 
latter could be compromised if brutally illegal means are adopted to end the war more quickly). 
These principles do not decide specific cases but they are factors in the decisions. The numerous 
post-World War II military trials in Europe and Asia were often decided on the basis of these 
principles, particularly in the sentences that were meted out, when the defendants pleaded 
exceptions to the rules of the conduct of war that were applied to them. 
 
 General principles of law can thus be very important as weights or factors in  
international legal decision-making. Their operation in this respect is very much like that  
described by Professor McDougal and his associates, who however were talking about the  
rules and norms of international law as well as principles (and thus perhaps cast too wide  
a net).FN50 By virtue of the inclusion of general principles in Article 38, and also through  
their basic familiarity to lawyers as described by Professor Onuf, "general principles of  
law recognized by civilized nations" has become prima facie an objective validator of  
international principles. When a given principle arises in a case or dispute, its proponent  
should examine the domestic law of all the nations (if he has the time and resources to do  
so!) and if he can show that most or all nations recognize the principle in their domestic  
legal systems, he will have made out a prima facie case for the inclusion of that principle  
in the international legal dispute. However, mere similarity in provisions in the laws of  
many nations does not itself mean that a similar rule is a rule of international law. To lift  
the rule from national to international status still requires some showing of customary  
law—that the rule has been applied in at least one interaction between states.  
 
 Unilateral Declarations and International Law Formation. We have seen that  
a unilateral claim or declaration by a state cannot per se be evidence of customary law  
inasmuch as the claim may be patently illegal or it may be a trial balloon with the  
claimant state not intending to follow through upon the claim unless the reaction of  
other states is favorable. Yet in the past few years we have witnessed a proliferation of  
unilateral claims on the part of coastal states to various kinds of exclusive jurisdiction or  
control over contiguous zones of the high seas and submarine areas. Perhaps these claims  
have been partially inspired by the success of the Truman Proclamation of September 28,  
1945FN51 regarding the continental shelf of the United States. This famous proclamation  
deserves a closer look with respect to the question of its impact upon general norms of  
international law. 
 
 President Truman proclaimed that the policy of the United States was to regard the  
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continental shelf "as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and  
control. "FN52 A month later Mexico followed with a similar Presidential Proclamation, and   
[pg104] before the decade was over another twelve nations had issued similar unilateral decrees. 
FN53 When, if at any time, was any law created by these decrees? 
 
 The Truman Proclamation did not descend upon an unsuspecting world. The United 
States Department of State had shown a draft of the proclamation to representatives of Canada, 
Cuba, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and 
the Soviet Union, and none of the governments consulted expressed opposition, to the American 
proposal to issue the proclamation.FN54 At least with respect to all the governments consulted, 
we may say that a consensus had been reached prior to the date of Truman's proclamation. In 
addition to this consensus, we must not overlook the fact that prior to 1945 there was scant 
attention to the continental shelf, and certainly there was no rule of international law in 
opposition to coastal state control over its continental shelf. Had there been such a law saying, 
for example, that the continental shelf belonged to all nations equally, then the Truman 
Proclamation would have had a harder burden of justification. Moreover, we might even assume 
that if such a law existed, the nations consulted on the draft proclamation, or some of them, 
probably would have objected. Therefore, we might conclude tentatively that the Truman 
Proclamation articulated a rule that the world community was prepared to accept in an area 
where there was no contrary rule or practice. 
  
 Now let us look at the situation a month or two after the issuance of the Truman  
Proclamation. Other states now had a clear opportunity to protest. In the absence of  
protest, we have additional evidence of a universal consensus. The evidence is not  
conclusive, as I have argued elsewhere, because states may reasonably not want to protest  
even though they disagree with the claim.FN55 
 
 Further evidence of consensus occurs when state after state issues decrees similar to  
the Truman Proclamation. As time has passed and more states have become aware of  
riches in the continental shelf, more states have issued such decrees. In more recent years  
when some states have realized that the coastal states' claims deprive others of access to  
minerals, the have-not states have complained, but then the objections may have come  
too late. A consensus may already have been formed. 
  
 But apart from the operations of consensus, customary law was forming when states  
began to act upon their claims. Truman's proclamation itself did not create customary  
law; it supplied an articulation of a rule, but not any underlying practice. Nor was there  
a commitment to act (as would have obtained had there been a treaty relating to the  
continental shelf). But with the course of time, mining and fishing (sedentary) operations  
on the continental shelves of various countries that were confined exclusively to nationals  
or (even stronger evidence) licensed to non-nationals created customary law binding upon  
all nations. It is by virtue of this practice, rather than the more frail need of consensus,  
that the rule of coastal state jurisdiction is so strong today.  
 
 The continental shelf story contains lessons for claims today for exclusive jurisdiction  
over wide contiguous zones. Suppose a nation claims that it owns 500 miles of the ocean  
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perpendicular to its coastline. The claim may be expressed in a presidential proclamation,  
in an amendment to the state's own constitution, or in any similar fashion. Such a claim,  
unlike Truman's, intrudes upon an area already subject to a clear rule of international  
law—the freedom of the seas. Now, what are we to make of such a claim?  
 
 In the first place, if the nation making the claim has previously shown a draft to a  
[pg105] large number of states and has received no objections, then the claim might be 
expressive of a new consensus. (There is nothing logically wrong with a new consensus of all 
states that wipes out the previous rule of freedom of the seas—states in the aggregate are free to 
change any rule of international law because they are the creator-subjects of international rules.) 
If the nation making the claim does not show a draft to other states, we might assume that it 
chooses not to show the draft because it knows that the other states would object. This 
assumption, of course, stems from the fact that a contrary rule already obtains in the area of the 
proposed declaration. 
 
 What is the status of the international law of freedom of the seas a month after a state 
makes a unilateral claim to 500 miles of contiguous zones? Has the claim changed the 
established rule? Has it even planted a seed of change? Here, I think we have to be careful and 
analytically precise. 
 
 If the claim represents a new consensus, then of course it may be indicative of a change 
in the underlying rule. But, in all likelihood, the 500-mile claim does not indicate a change of 
attitude on the part of other states. If it does, then in due course we will see the fruition of that 
change of attitude as other states make 500-mile claims and respect the claims of states that have 
already made similar declarations; in that case, the process of consensus would be at work. But 
let us now look at the single 500-mile claim in isolation. Suppose no other state has (yet) made a 
similar claim. Does the single 500-mile claim itself change, even slightly, the underlying 
freedom-of-the-seas rule? 
 
 Clearly no change has taken place at this point through the process of consensus, since a 
single state by definition does not create a consensus. In the absence of other states issuing or 
respecting similar claims, there is no consensus. A single state's unilateral declaration therefore 
has absolutely no effect upon the underlying international rule through the operation of 
consensus. For the consensus operation to work, we need many more than one state. What we 
need is the participation of other states in the 500-mile rule plus the contemporary absence of 
protest (or other forms of disagreement) from the rest of the states. Practically speaking, this is 
unlikely, although, as I have noted, it is not logically impossible. 
 
 What then of the operation of custom as a universal validator of the 500-mile claim? 
FN56 Let us look at the single state's unilateral claim. Does the claim constitute a customary 
practice? Here the answer must be no. At best the claim articulates a rule which could be realized 
by acts of the claimant state that affect other states. But an articulation of a rule cannot itself be 
custom, for the basic reason that the claimant state has done nothing internationally except state a 
claim. The claim itself runs contrary to the rule of freedom of the seas. The state issuing the 
claim may not even intend to back it up; it may simply be issuing a trial balloon. Moreover, other 
states would have no reason to protest this claim. They may believe that the issuing state does 
22 
 
not intend to follow through on actualizing the claim, or they may believe that there will be 
enough time to dispute it when the claimant state actually tries to do something in support of its 
claim (e.g., seize another state's fishing boat 450 miles offshore). Finally, other states may 
continue to act on the understanding that fisheries 450 miles off any state's coastline are open to 
all states, and thus state practice is built up daily with respect to the rule of freedom of the seas. 
This practice, all the other states may believe, is enough to overwhelm any attempt at a contrary 
practice by the single state making a 500-mile claim.  
 
 [pg106] If the state's 500-mile claim has no impact, standing alone, either upon consensus 
or custom as validators of the claim, is it a totally futile gesture from a legal standpoint? Of 
course, it may start the ball rolling so that, if other states emulate and repeat the claim, eventually 
consensus or custom may create a 500-mile exclusive jurisdiction rule in what was formerly the 
high seas. But this is saying very little, for the legal impact of the claimant's proclamation 
depends upon the actions of others. Is there no legal significance to the claimant's proclamation 
standing alone? The only significance that I can find is that it is an invitation, an offer, for 
reciprocal treatment that would amount to a treaty. State A makes a 500-mile claim. By such a 
claim it is inviting state B both to respect the claim of A and to expect A to stay out of B's 500-
mile zone. If B acts accordingly, then a tacit treaty has arisen between A .and B. (Moreover, B 
has joined in A's claim, and thus we have the real beginnings of a customary practice and 
maybe even a start toward a new international consensus.) Thus, A's claim is not without legal 
significance; rather, it is like an offer to engage in a contract. 
  
 International law could not be law if every act or claim made by a nation could be 
justified. Some acts and some claims must be illegal; they must run afoul of the prevailing law. 
The possibility for changing international law occurs when more than one state is involved in an 
act or a claim. When one state acts and another state receives the action (e.g., A fishes off B's 
coast and B allows the fishing to go on without interference), customary practice is either created 
or reinforced. When one state makes a claim and another state agrees to the claim, a treaty is 
established; the treaty itself then has the status of the practice of states and it creates or reinforces 
universally valid customary rules. In sum, international law cannot be created or changed by one 
nation acting; in splendid isolation. International law is law between (or among) nations; a nation 
acting alone or making a unilateral declaration with no concurrence from other states is merely 
operating in the domestic legal realm. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVE VALIDATION 
  
 There is something of a feeling among those who are introduced to the study of 
international law that it is an indeterminate form of law lacking in provable content or authorized 
validation procedures. According to Hart, international law in the present day lacks this "rule of 
recognition" which, someday, will make it a "mature" legal system.FN57 Advocates in 
international law cases sometimes throw in the kitchen sink in an effort to prove their 
contentions; they cite anything that has ever been published if it will help their contention that a 
given alleged rule is in fact a rule of international law. In so doing, they are imitating the father 
of international law, Grotius himself, who seemed to draw upon any published source 
indiscriminately to prove his contentions about the content of international law. And we cannot 
blame Grotius or his present-day (sometimes unknowing) imitators; they are, after all, advocates. 
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But judges have a different obligation, and so do nations in passing upon the claims of other 
nations. If Iran believes that diplomatic personnel may be seized from an American embassy in 
Teheran if they are spies for the American government, no responsible nation in passing upon, or 
reacting to, that claim should allow the claim to be proved by citation of indiscriminate sources 
(for example, a Marxist-Leninist tract to the effect that capitalist nations always illegally spy 
upon other governments). Instead, reference to customary law and to the Vienna [pg107] 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 FN58 amply proves that diplomats are expected to 
gather information about the host country and transmit it confidentially to their own country. Of 
course, here the rule is clear, but in other cases where the rule is not clear we should not make 
the mistake of concluding that, therefore, the sources of the rule are indeterminate. Not only is 
too much at stake (rapid escalation of competing legal claims leading to military confrontation), 
but also international legal theory has come a long way from the days of Grotius. The increasing 
attention being paid to the need for, and the procedures for, objective validation of rules of 
international law in a burgeoning literature of international law evidences the seriousness of the 
problem, the responsibility of scholars for careful scholarship in this area of legal theory, and 
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